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EMBEZZLED FUNDS AS TAXABLE INCOME:
A STUDY IN JUDICIAL FOOTWORK
Jerome B. Libin* and George R. Haydon, Jr.**

D

EsPrrE the narrow scope of its application, the question whether
embezzled funds are includible in gross income in the year
of acquisition has perplexed the courts for a number of years and
has even received consideration by the Supreme Court on two
separate occasions.
While the Treasury early announced that funds misappropriated through embezzlement would be deemed taxable to the embezzler in the year of acquisition,' the lower courts disagreed over
the validity of this rule. A conflict of opinion in the courts of appeals2 ultimately led the Supreme Court to review the question for
the first time in 1946. In Commissioner v. Wilcox,3 decided by a
vote of seven to one, the Court held that funds which had been
misappropriated by a bookkeeper who had been convicted of embezzlement did not constitute taxable income to him in the year
of acquisition. The Treasury promptly modified its position in
accordance with the Wilcox decision.4
A 1959 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit brought the issue back to the Supreme Court for a second
time. The case involved a union official who, after having been
convicted of embezzling union funds, was also convicted of tax
evasion for failing to report the misappropriated funds as income
during the years 1951 through 1954. On appeal, the taxpayer had
contended that his conviction should not stand for the reason
that, under the Wilcox decision, the funds were not taxable to
him in the years of misappropriation. The Seventh Circuit, re*Member of the District of Columbia and Illinois Bars.-Ed.
o

Member of the Missouri Bar.-Ed.

I G.C.M. 16572, XV-1 Cumr. BuLL. 82 (1936).
2 Compare Kurrle v. Helvering, 126 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1942) (holding embezzled
funds taxable), with Wilcox v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1945), and McKnight
v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1942) (holding such funds non-taxable).
3 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
4 G.C.M. 24945, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 27.

MICHIGAN LAW REviEw

426

[Vol. 61

fusing to follow Wilcox, held that the embezzled funds should have
been reported by the taxpayer and that his conviction for tax evasion was proper. 5 The court relied on the intervening decision of
the Supreme Court in Rutkin v. United States,' in which the
Court, dividing five to four, had ruled that money obtained by
extortion is taxable to the extortioner. In view of the square conflict between the decision of the Seventh Circuit and its earlier
Wilcox decision, the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.7
By a vote of six to three it held, in James v. United States,8 that
embezzled funds do indeed constitute taxable income to the embezzler in the year of misappropriation, and accordingly overruled
Wilcox. Yet, despite the conclusion that the embezzled funds were
taxable, the taxpayer's conviction for tax evasion was reversed as
the result of a sharp division on the Court regarding the appropriate basis for disposing of the case.
The James case might not be worthy of extensive comment
if its only significance rested on the decision that embezzled funds
constitute taxable income in the year of misappropriation. But
close analysis of the five separate opinions that were written indicates that James may have considerable significance beyond its
precise holding.
I.

THE EXPANDING CONCEPT OF TAXABLE INCOME

Perhaps the most important feature of the James case is its
status as the first case in which the entire Supreme Court has
considered the scope and meaning of section 61(a), the "gross income" provision of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. By virtue
of this fact, any insight as to the continued authority under section 61(a) of decisions construing prior "gross income" provisions,
and as to the scope of section 61(a) in a constitutional sense, must
at present be gleaned primarily from the James decision.
A discussion of the power of Congress to tax income typically
begins by reference to the sixteenth amendment, which provides:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
income, fTom whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several states, and without regard to any census or
enumeration."9 However, the power of Congress to tax income
5 United States v. James, 273 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1959).
6 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
7 362 U.S. 974 (1960).
8 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
9 U.S. CONsr. amend. XVI.
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did not stem from ratification of the sixteenth amendment in
1913. Article I of the Constitution granted Congress full power
"to lay and collect taxes,"' 0 subject to the limitation that "direct
taxes" must be apportioned among the states on the basis of population. 1 In Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 12 decided in

1895, a divided Supreme Court had held that a tax on income
in the form of rents, dividends, and interest was equivalent to a
"direct tax" on the income-producing property itself, and, since
not apportioned, was unconstitutional. The sixteenth amendment
was an outgrowth of the Supreme Court's decision in the Pollock
case, and was designed solely to eliminate the requirement of apportionment which in Pollock had been held applicable to the taxation of certain types of income.'
The Revenue Act of 1913, the first income tax statute passed
after adoption of the sixteenth amendment,' 4 and all subsequent
income tax statutes enacted by Congress through the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, contained a disjunctive catch-all definition of "gross income" subject to tax-"gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever."' 5 In thus defining statutory income, Congress might have contemplated any one of three
different possibilities. It could have intended: (1) to include something less than the "income" embraced by the sixteenth amendment; (2) to equate the statutory phrase with sixteenth amendU.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cI. 1.
11 U.S. Coxsr. art. I, § 2, ci. 3, and art. I, § 9, cl. 4. Other restrictions not relevant
for purposes of this discussion are that: (1) "Duties, Imposts and Excises" must be "uni.
form throughout the United States" (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1), and (2) no tax or
duty may be laid on exports (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, ci. 5).
12 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
13 See generally SUREY & WARREN, CASES ON FEDER.AL INcOME TAXATON 1-12 (1960 ed.).
14 In Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916), the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Revenue Act of 1913, the first income tax act to be enacted
after ratification of the sixteenth amendment. Speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
White, the only remaining member of the Court who had participated in the Pollock
decision, in which he had dissented, the Court explained the purpose of the sixteenth
amendment as follows: "It is ciear on the face of this text that it [the sixteenth amendment] does not purport to confer power to levy income taxes in a generic sensean authority already possessed and never questioned--or to limit and distinguish between
one kind of income taxes and another, but that the whole purpose of the Amendment
was to relieve all income taxes when imposed from apportionment from a consideration
of the source whence the income was derived." 240 U.S. at 17-18.
15 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(a), 53 Stat. 9; Revenue Act of 1938,
ch. 289, § 22(a), 52 Stat. 457; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 22(a), 49 Stat. 1657;
Revenue Act of 1934, ch, 277, § 22(a), 48 Stat. 686; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209,
§ 22(a), 47 Stat. 178; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 22(a), 45 Stat. 797; Revenue Act
of 1926, ch. 27, § 213, 44 Stat. 23; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 213, 43 Stat. 267;
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 213, 42 Stat. 237; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213,
40 Stat. 1065; Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757; Income Tax Act of
1913, ch. 16, § lIB, 37 Stat. 167. This language was first used in the Civil War income
tax acts.
30
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ment "income"; or (3)to encompass not only sixteenth amendment
"income" but also all gains which would not be subject to the
"direct tax" limitation.
In the landmark case of Eisner v. Macomber,' the express provision in the Revenue Act of 1916 that the disjunctive definition
of "gross income" was intended to encompass stock dividends 17
was challenged on constitutional grounds. After tracing the history of the sixteenth amendment, the Court stated:
"A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear
language, requires also that this Amendment shall not be
extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify,
except as applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment according to population for direct taxes upon property, real and personal."' 8
The Court adopted as the definition of "income" embraced by
the sixteenth amendment the definition it had enunciated in two
earlier cases'-''the gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined"-adding that "it be understood to include
profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets." 20 After
thus limiting the possible sources of "income" covered by the
sixteenth amendment, the Court went farther and read into the
word "derived" the so-called "realization" doctrine, thereby adding the further restrictions that a gain must be severed from capital
and come under the dominion of the taxpayer to constitute "income" as the Court had defined it. 1 Dividing five to four, the
Court concluded that the recipient of a true stock dividend "has
received nothing that answers the definition of income within
the meaning of the 16th Amendment." 22 It was accordingly held
2

16 252 U.S. 189 (1920).

17 In Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918), the Supreme Court had held that
the disjunctive definition of "gross income" contained in the Revenue Act of 1913
did not include stock dividends within its scope. Congress reacted to the Towne
decision by expressly providing, in § 2(a) of the Revenue Act of 1916, that the disjunctive definition was intended to encompass stock dividends.
18 252 U.S. at 206. (Emphasis added.)
19 Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918), and Stratton's Independence
v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913), both decided under the Corporation Tax Act
of 1909.
20 252 U.S. at 207.
21 " 'Derived-from-capital';-'thegain-derived-from--capital,' etc. Here we have
the esssential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not a growth or increment of
value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, severed from the capital however invested or employed,
and coming in, being 'derived,' that is, received, or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal;-that is income derived from property.
Nothing else answers the description." Ibid.
22 Id. at 211.
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that Congress had no power to tax such a dividend without apportionment. The Macomber decision thus indicated that a majority of the Supreme Court viewed its definition of sixteenth amendment "income" as the equivalent of the statutory disjunctive clause
defining "gross income."
But the restrictive requirements as to severance and dominion
supplied by the Court in Macomber were gradually lessened as
the Court began to whittle away at the Macomber definition of
"income" in cases presenting a variety of factual situations.2 3 Indeed, in Helveringv. Horst,24 the Court declared that the so-called
"realization" doctrine relied on so heavily in Macomber was a
rule "founded on administrative convenience." 25 And in Wilcox
and Rutkin, the two leading cases involving the taxability of unlawful gains decided prior to James, the limitations on source laid
down in Macomber were seemingly forgotten.
In 1946 the Court was confronted in Wilcox with the question
whether embezzled funds fell within the reach of the disjunctive
statutory definition of "gross income." Although it pointed to
earlier decisions which had interpreted the disjunctive clause as
being "cast in broad, sweeping terms" and indicating "the purpose
of Congress to use the full measure of its taxing power within those
definable categories, "26 the Court nevertheless proceeded to hold
that a taxable gain was conditioned upon "(1) the presence of a
claim of right to the alleged gain and (2) the absence of a definite,
unconditional obligation to repay or return that which would
otherwise constitute a gain."' 27 It concluded that "the bare receipt
23 Thus, shortly after Macomber, the Court held that a stock dividend was taxable
if made as the result of a separation of assets by the distributing corporation [United
States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921), and Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176
(1921)], or if it caused a change in the shareholder's proportionate interest in the
corporation [Koshland v. Helvering, 297 U.S. 702 (1935), and Marr v. United States,
268 U.S. 536 (1925)]. It was at least questionable whether such stock dividends satisfied
the "severance" requirement set forth in Macomber. In Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S.
461 (1940), the Court held that, upon termination of a lease, the increase in value of
the underlying property which resulted from improvements made by the lessee was
taxable to the lessor under the disjunctive definition of "gross income," as then contained in the Revenue Act of 1932, notwithstanding the lack of "severance" involved.
Similarly, the "dominion" concept as enunciated by the Court in Macomber was considerably broadened in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), in which the grantor
of a short-term trust, of which his wife was beneficiary and under which he had
retained substantial control over the corpus, was regarded as in substance the owner
of the corpus and accordingly was taxed on the trust income.
24 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
25 Id. at 116. The Court held in Horst that the owner of income-producing bonds
could be taxed on the interest from such bonds even though he had given the interest-

bearing coupons to his son prior to maturity.
268327 U.S. 404,
27 Id. at 408.

407 (1946).
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of property or money wholly belonging to another lacks the essential characteristics of a gain or profit within the meaning of
§ 22(a) [the "gross income" provision of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code]." 28 But, in thus concluding that a proper interpretation of the disjunctive phrase did not encompass embezzled funds,
the Court made no reference to the Macomber decision or its
declaration that the source of taxable "income" had to be capital,
labor or both combined.
Then, six years later, the Court held in Rutkin that funds
obtained by extortion, although constituting "unlawful receipts,"
were nevertheless within the reach of the "gross income" provision. Its interpretation of the statutory provision as reaching
extorted funds was explained as follows:
"We think the power of Congress to tax these receipts as
income under the Sixteenth Amendment is unquestionable.
The broad language of § 22(a) supports the declarations of
this Court that Congress in enacting that section exercised its
full power to tax income. We therefore conclude that § 22(a)
reaches these receipts."29
The "claim of right" approach taken in Wilcox was virtually
ignored. But, while apparently altering its prior interpretation of
the "gross income" provision with respect to unlawful receipts,
the Court indicated its continued adherence to the general notion
that the sixteenth amendment "income" concept established the
outer limits of the scope of the disjunctive clause. Again, however,
no attempt was made to satisfy the Macomber standard respecting
the source of taxable "income," which seemingly would have precluded the taxation of funds derived from unlawful activity such
as extortion.
While Macomber's demands had been considerably lessened
not until the Court's 1955 decision in Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass Co.30 was it suggested that the disjunctive clause of the
"gross income" provision encompassed something more than sixteenth amendment "income." Glenshaw Glass involved the taxability of punitive damages awarded in successful civil antitrust
litigation-a so-called "windfall" to the taxpayer. The Commissioner argued that it was immaterial whether punitive damages
constituted "income" within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment, since Congress had the power under article I of the Consti28 Ibid.
29 343 U.S. at 138-39.
30 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
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tution to tax such receipts without apportionment, even before
the adoption of that amendment. 1 It was the Commissioner's contention that the statutory expression "gains ... derived from any

source whatever" in the "gross income" provision added something
to the statutory term "income."
"The word 'gain' in the statute, which is valid under Article
I of the Constitution, and not the word 'income' in the Sixteenth Amendment, therefore, controls the question whether
payments of punitive damages are taxable to the recipient."3
The taxpayer conceded that Congress could constitutionally tax
punitive damages, but asserted that section 22(a) did not reach
such receipts on the ground that the Macomber definition of sixteenth amendment "income" had established the meaning of the
entire statutory catchall clause. Since punitive damages were not
derived from capital, labor or both combined, it was argued, they
were not subject to tax. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for
a majority of the Court, made it clear at the outset that the question involved was one of statutory construction rather than constitutional power. After emphasizing the entire disjunctive- clause
of the statute-"gains or profits and income derived from any
source whatever"-the Chief Justice stated that the Court "has
given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted. 3 Since punitive damages constituted undeniable accessions to wealth which had been clearly realized and
which were under the complete dominion of the taxpayer, as were
the extortion receipts in Rutkin, the Court concluded that such
receipts were taxable.
"We would do violence to the plain meaning of the statute
and restrict a clear legislative attempt to bring the taxing
power to bear upon all receipts constitutionally taxable were
we to say that the payments in question here are not gross
income." 34
From the broad language used in the Glenshaw Glass decision,
31 See Penn Mut. Indem. Co., 32 T.C. 653 (1959), aff'd, 277 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1960),
sustaining as constitutional the provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 which
imposed a tax on the gross premiums of mutual insurance companies without regard
to underwriting losses. The tax was deemed a valid indirect tax. Thus, the meaning
of sixteenth amendment "income" was considered irrelevant.
32 Brief for Commissioner, p. 11, Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426

(1955).
33 348 U.S. at 430. (Emphasis added.)
34 Id. at 432-33. (Emphasis added.)
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it could be inferred that the Court had construed the disjunctive
catchall clause in section 22(a) as reaching not only sixteenth
amendment "income" as defined in Macomber, but also all receipts not subject to the "direct tax" limitation. Indeed, the Court
in Glenshaw Glass indicated that while the Macomber definition
of "income" served a "useful purpose" in "distinguishing gain
from capital," it was "not meant to provide a touchstone to all
future gross income questions."8 5 Moreover, in General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner,3 6 a companion case to Glenshaw
Glass, the Court took occasion to reiterate its position, with respect to the taxability of "insider profits," as follows:
"The payments in controversy were neither capital contributions nor gifts.... There is no indication that Congress intended to exempt them from coverage. In accordance with the
legislative design to reach all gain constitutionally taxable unless specifically excluded, we conclude that the petitioner is
liable for the tax. ...
These decisions, interpreting section 22(a) of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code, unquestionably represented the Court's most
sweeping declarations regarding the scope of the "gross income"
provision.38
When the Internal Revenue Code was overhauled in 1954,
the disjunctive catchall clause of section 22(a) was discarded in
favor of the streamlined "shotgun" clause now contained in section 61(a)-"gross income means all income from whatever source
derived." It is thus necessary to determine whether the broad concepts of taxability enunciated by the Court in Glenshaw Glass
and General American Investors were carried over into the streamlined "gross income" provision of the 1954 Code.
In this respect, it is significant to note the explanation provided in the Senate report accompanying the 1954 Code substitute
for the earlier disjunctive clause.
35 Id. at 431.
36 Id. at 434.
37 Id. at 436. (Emphasis added.) Contrast this with the situation which existed under
earlier income tax acts, when it was not even thought necessary to include a specific
provision in the statute excluding legacies and testamentary gifts from income tax. Indeed,
the Treasury itself expressed the view in early regulations that legacies and testamentary
gifts were not income. See Wright, The Effect of the Source of Realized Benefits Upon
the Supreme Court's Concept of Taxable Receipts, 8 STAN. L. REv. 164, 171 (1956).
38 Although the language in these opinions was far-reaching, it should be made
clear that no question of "severance" or "dominion" arose in either case, and there
unquestionably was a "gain" realized by the taxpayer in each instance. For a thorough
discussion of this entire area, through the decisions in Glenshaw Glass and General
American Investors, see Wright, supra note 37.
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"This section [61(a)] corresponds to section 22(a) of the 1939
Code. While the language in existing section 22(a) has been
simplified, the all-inclusive nature of statutory gross income
has not been affected thereby. Section 61(a) is as broad in
scope as section 22(a).
"Section 61(a) provides that gross income includes 'all
income from whatever source derived.' This definition is
based upon the sixteenth amendment and the word 'income'
is used as in section 22(a) in its constitutional sense. It is not
intended to change the concept of income that obtains under
section 22(a)." 39
The House report's explanation of the meaning of section 61(a)
was in virtually identical terms, except for the omission of the
final sentence contained in the Senate report. 40 On the basis of

this legislative history, as well as the language of section 61(a)
itself, it appears fairly clear that Congress intended to equate
statutory "gross income" under the 1954 Code with the concept
of "income" embodied in the sixteenth amendment. Accordingly,
in order for the Court to continue to apply its broad philosophy
of taxability as enunciated in Glenshaw Glass, it seemingly must
read its concept of "gross income" into the sixteenth amendment.
It can no longer rely on the phrase "gains... derived from any
source whatever" to support its conclusion.
Interestingly enough, the Court may have anticipated this
problem in Glenshaw Glass, in view of its casual statement there
that "the definition of gross income has been simplified [in the
1954 Code], but no effect upon its present broad scope was intended."41
The Court thus far has decided only two cases arising under
section' 61(a) of the 1954 Code, United States v. Kaiser42 and the
James case. Not surprisingly, both decisions make it clear that
the Court intends to read the "shotgun" clause of section 61(a)
as encompassing all that its predecessors reached.
The Kaiser case involved the taxability of certain strike benefits, in the form of rent and food vouchers, received by striking
workers during the famous Kohler strike in 1954. A jury had
found that the strike benefits were "gifts," excludable from "gross
income" under section 102(a) of the 1954 Code. The trial judge
set aside the jury verdict, but the court of appeals reinstated it.
39
40
41
42

S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1954).
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A18 (1954).
348 U.S. at 432.
363 U.S. 299 (1960).
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Before the Supreme Court the taxpayer argued that such benefits were not taxable, contending that even under the rationale
of Glenshaw Glass, receipts did not constitute "income" without
an element of profit or gain which, he asserted, was lacking in
the case of strike benefits. He relied on a series of Treasury rulings holding non-taxable various types of assistance payments
received by taxpayers, and reasoned, on the basis of these rulings,
that "subsistence strike relief benefits fall within the category of
alleviative receipts-a category lacking the quantity of enrichment
to the recipient which appears to be a necessary ingredient of the
concept of 'gains, profits or income.' "43 In the alternative, the
taxpayer contended that the strike benefits were, as found by the
jury, "gifts" excludable from gross income under section 102(a).
The United States took the position that, in light of Glenshaw
Glass, "the only 'gross income' question is whether there has been
a realized gain; if so, it is taxable unless excluded by one of the
express exemptions.1 44 It asserted that the taxpayer had clearly
enjoyed a realized gain upon receipt of the strike benefits, a gain
which could not properly be classified as an excludable "gift."
Finally, the United States contended that even the Macomber
definition of "income" had been satisfied, since the strike benefits
represented gain derived from refraining from labor.
Four members of the Court in Kaiser concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that the
strike benefits were "gifts," and found it unnecessary to decide
the "income" question. 45 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
himself and Mr. Justice Clark, considered the "income" question
43 Brief for Taxpayer, pp. 27-28, United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960).
44 Brief for United States, p. 40, United States v. Kaiser, supra note 43. The
United States did indicate, however, that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would
not likely press the constitutional argument in Glenshaw Glass to its logical extreme.
It referred to Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 CuM. BuLL. 17, which held the value of turkeys,
hams and other merchandise of nominal value distributed to employees at Christmas
or other comparable holidays to be non-taxable, and indicated that this ruling represented "a recognition that it is neither feasible as an administrative matter nor a
reasonable burden to impose on taxpayers to require every non-monetary receipt, however nominal, to be accounted for." While Glenshaw Glass was said to have put an end
"to metaphysical disputes over the 'nature' and 'sources' of income," it was also viewed
as not precluding "such a recognition of the practical necessity of limiting the reach
of 61(a) to 'significant' transactions and not overburdening the tax system with accounting for de minimis receipts of benefits in kind." Brief for United States, p. 5,
United States v. Kaiser, supra. This explanation of Rev. Rul. 59-58 counteracts any
argument which might be made that such a ruling limits the breadth of § 61(a).
45 Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and
Douglas, relied on the companion case of Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278
(1960), to support the conclusion that whether the strike benefits were "gifts" was a
question for the jury to decide.
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on its merits and went to great lengths to undercut the taxpayer's
reliance on the Treasury rulings holding various types of assistance payments non-taxable. 4 After rejecting the taxpayer's "alleviative receipts" argument, Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed the
view that strike benefits fell within the statutory concept of "gross
income," but concluded that the peculiar circumstances of the
case supported the jury's verdict. He and Mr. Justice Clark thus
supplied the necessary votes to dispose of the case on the ground
that the strike benefits were "gifts," excludable from gross income
under section 102(a). Mr. Justice Whittaker, dissenting along
with Justices Harlan and Stewart, relegated the "income" question to a footnote. In his view, strike benefits were taxable on
the following ground:
"Strike benefits constitute realized gains to their recipients,
as a partial substitute for lost wages rather than lost capital,
and are materially different in nature from the various categories of realized gains which have been treated as non-taxable
through administrative fiat.... Strike benefits are, therefore,
within the reach of the 'gross income' provision of the Code.
See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 42930.)047

Mr. Justice Whittaker also argued in dissent that strike benefits,
as a matter of law, were not excludable gifts.
Thus, five Justices in Kaiser (Frankfurter, Clark, Whittaker,
Harlan and Stewart) considered the question whether strike benefits constitute "gross income" and all five agreed that such benefits
were within the scope of section 61(a). Yet the significance of
this aspect of the Kaiser decision is somewhat limited in view of
the recent changes in Court personnel 48 and the fact that the other
four members of the Court declined to consider the issue.
Consequently, it remained for the James case to be the first
in which the full Court considered the scope and application of
48 Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that most of the rulings relied on by the
taxpayer dealt with payments which either constituted a gift or represented compensation for the loss of an item which would not itself have been considered income. The
rulings which held non-taxable certain federal welfare payments were considered readily
distinguishable from a situation involving payments made under a private arrangement.
See his concurring opinion, 363 U.S. at 305.
47 363 U.S. at 328 n.2 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Whittaker's approach to the
question appears to be precisely the approach taken by the Court in Glenshaw Glass
and General American Investors, under the disjunctive § 22(a) of the 1939 Code.
48 Both Mr. Justice Whittaker and Mr. Justice Frankfurter have since retired from
the Court, and have been replaced by Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Goldberg,
respectively. Any discussion at this time of the philosophy of the new Justices with
respect to matters of federal income taxation would involve pure speculation.
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the "gross income" provision of the 1954 Code. In fact, since
James involved the taxable years 1951-1954, the Court was required to determine whether embezzled funds were within the
reach of both the disjunctive clause of section 22(a) of the 1939
Code and its streamlined successor, section 61(a). Although not
unexpectedly, in light of the legislative history of section 61(a)
and the Court's comment in Glenshaw Glass, the taxpayer in
James made no contention that a different standard was to be
applied in determining the taxability of embezzled funds under
the two provisions. The United States considered the point of
enough significance to warrant a terse footnote in its brief, which
stated: "As the Court noted in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 348 U.S. 426, the simplification of the language in the gross
income definition of the 1954 Code [§ 61(a)] was not intended
to affect its scope.

49

Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion in James, joined on this
point by five others, reviewed the history of the Wilcox and Rutkin
cases, and concluded that the reasoning of the Rutkin decision,
holding extorted funds taxable under section 22(a), had "thoroughly devitalized" and "effectively vitiated" the prior Wilcox
decision. Wilcox was accordingly overruled, and embezzled funds
were held to be within the reach of both section 22(a) and section
61(a). To make it clear that the change in statutory language in
1954 had no effect upon the Court's approach to "gross income"
questions, Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion referred to the
two provisions almost interchangeably.
"And the Court has given a liberal construction to the broad
phraseology of the 'gross income' definition statutes in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except
those specifically exempted.... The language of § 22(a) of
the 1939 Code, 'gains or profits and income derived from
any source whatever,' and the more simplified language of
§ 61(a) of the 1954 Code, 'all income from whatever source
derived,' have been held to encompass all 'accessions to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion.' ""
This statement convincingly establishes the Court's readiness
to read into section 61(a) the broad concept of "gross income"
it had previously enunciated in Glenshaw Glass. Indeed, since
the sweeping statements which had been made by the Court in
49

Brief for United States, p. 14, James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).

50 366 U.S. at 219.
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some of its more recent decisions had laid considerable groundwork for the holding in James, the only unusual aspect of the
decision in this respect was the formulation by Mr. Chief Justice
Warren of an additional test for taxability.
"When a taxpayer acquires earnings, lawfully or unlawfully, without the consensual recognition, express or implied,
of an obligation to repay and without restriction as to their
disposition, 'he has received income which he is required to
return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not
entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still
be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.' North American
Oil v. Burnet .

.

. This standard brings wrongful appro-

priations within the broad sweep of 'gross income'; it excludes
loans." 51
Apparently the Court felt that such a test was necessary to support
the distinction which it drew between funds acquired through
embezzlement and a bona fide loan, though the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Whittaker vigorously argued that the
distinction was fallacious and the test meaningless.52 But despite
Mr. Justice Black's urging that broad general standards of taxability should not be accepted as "universal panaceas" designed
51 Ibid. The Court's language appears to be an improvised version of the so-called
"claim of right" test originally set forth in North Am. Oil v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424
(1932), which involved the question of when particular receipts, which were admittedly
income, were subject to tax. It will be recalled that the majority opinion in Wilcox
emphasized the absence of a bona fide "claim of right" to embezzled funds in support
of its conclusion on the question whether such funds could be subjected to tax. In
James, the United States asserted that the "claim of right" test was applicable only in
determining when particular receipts were taxable, and that use of the test in Wilcox
was erroneous. Mr. Chief Justice Warren declined to resolve this question, stating: "In
view of our reasoning set forth below, we need not pass on this contention. The use to
which we put the claim of right test here is only to demonstrate that, whatever its
validity as a test of whether certain receipts constitute income, it calls for no distinction
between Wilcox and Rutkin." 366 U.S. at 216 n.7. In light of this statement, the similarity
between the test formulated by the Chief Justice in James and the "claim of right" test
as originally enunciated in North American Oil is somewhat surprising. Mr. Justice Whittaker, in Iris dissent, agreed with the United States that the "claim of right" test applied
only in determining when particular receipts were subject to tax. 366 U.S. at 256-57. See
also note 52 infra.
52 For example, Mr. Justice Whittaker termed the test a "novel formula" with
"no support in our prior decisions." He also asserted that embezzled funds were in
no sense "earnings," stating that such funds "constitute the principal of a debt," since
an embezzler "is indebted to his victim in the full amount taken as surely as if he had
left a signed promissory note at the scene of the crime." Finally, Mr. Justice Whittaker
contended that "the law readily implies whatever 'consensual recognition' is needed"
to impose upon the embezzler an obligation to repay his victim. "By substituting this
meaningless abstraction in place of the omitted portion of the North American Oil
test of when a receipt constitutes taxable income, the prevailing opinion today goes
far beyond overruling Wilcox-it reduces a substantial body of tax law into uncertainty
and confusion." 366 U.S. at 251, 257 (dissenting opinion).
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to solve all gross income questions,5 3 the direction in which the
Court has pointed in James indicates rather clearly that just such
an approach is likely to be taken in future cases arising under
section 61(a).
II.

DOUBLE TAXATION AND FEDERAL TAX LIENS

The Court's decision in James-that embezzled funds are includible in the embezzler's gross income in the year of misappropriation-once again revived the problem of so-called "double
taxation." Prior to James, the basic interrelated tax effects of an
embezzlement upon the victim were clear. If the funds which
were taken had previously been reported by him as income, the
embezzlement gave rise to a deductible loss.5 4 To the extent that
the loss deduction provided the victim with a "tax benefit," any
amounts which were subsequently recovered constituted taxable
income in the year of recovery. 5 Although the victim was merely
regaining money which had rightfully belonged to him all along,
the prior "tax benefit" theoretically justified the tax levied on the
recovered funds.
With James holding that embezzled funds constitute taxable
income to the embezzler in the year of misappropriation, the possibility now exists that the Government may get a share of the
funds ahead of the victim. Mr. Justice Black viewed the Court's
holding as thus imposing a "double tax" on the victim, in the
form of a "property or excise tax on the rightful owner's embezzled funds, for which the owner has already once paid income
tax when he rightfully acquired them." 56 To him this suggested
that "a serious question of confiscation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment '57 might be raised.
While the same embezzled funds may now be subjected to a
tax at three possible stages-at the time of initial acquisition by
53 366 U.S. at 235 (dissenting opinion).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(a) (1960), which authorizes a loss deduction in the year
the loss is discovered, except to the extent that there exists in that year a claim for
reimbursement with respect to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery. In
Alsop v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1961), it was held that a cash basis taxpayer was not entitled to a loss deduction resulting from the embezzlement of funds
by her agent before the taxpayer had received the funds and reported them as income.
The Alsop case thus is illustrative of situations in which the embezzlement victim may
not pay a tax on the funds in question prior to their misappropriation.
55 See, e.g., South Dakota Concrete Prods. Co., 26 B.T.A. 1429 (1932). See also
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(iii) (1960). The majority in James indicated that the embezzler would be entitled to a deduction for the amount which he repays to the victim.
366 U.S. at 220.
56 366 U.S. at 228 (dissenting opinion).
54

57

Id. at 229.
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the owner, 58 at the time of embezzlement and at the time of
recovery by the owner, if he previously claimed a loss deduction
which yielded tax benefits-the argument that a tax exacted at
the embezzlement stage might result in "confiscation" of the
owner's property in violation of the fifth amendment appears
questionable. The tax in question is an income tax levied against
the embezzler, not a tax levied on the particular funds acquired.
The embezzler is free to satisfy his tax liability from any source
whatever. Although he may use the embezzled funds themselves
to pay all or part of the tax, such action provides no basis for
sustaining a claim that the Government has "taken" the victim's
property within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
To substantiate his position, however, Mr. Justice Black expressed the view that:
".... with the strong lien provisions of the federal income
tax law an owner of stolen funds would have a very rocky
road to travel before he got back, without paying a good slice
to the Federal Government, such funds as an embezzler who
had not paid the tax might, perchance, not have dissipated." 59
Mr. Justice Whittaker argued along the same lines, though he
did not go so far as to suggest a question of "confiscation." It was
his view that, in overruling Wilcox, the Court had adopted a rule
which would inflict manifest injury upon the embezzlement victim by permitting a federal tax lien to be asserted and enforced
against the embezzled funds ahead of the victim's claim for recovery. 60
It is true that holding an embezzler liable for the payment of
an income tax on misappropriated funds may well diminish the
victim's prospects of obtaining a full recovery. But it would
appear inaccurate to contend that the victim's right of recovery
will be affected by the attachment of a superior federal tax lien
on the embezzled funds. The Code provides that a federal tax
lien attaches to "all property and rights to property.., belonging
to" a delinquent taxpayer.". In Aquilino v. United States,12 decided just one year prior to James, the Court held that the tax58 This would not be true, of course, in situations such as that presented in Alsop
v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1961), in which the victim's agent misappropriates
the funds before the victim has received them and reported them as income.
69 366 U.S. at 229 (dissenting opinion).
60 Id. at 252.
61 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 6321.

62 363 U.S. 509 (1960). See also United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522
(1960); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
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payer's "property and rights to property" against which a federal
tax lien attaches were to be determined under state law. There
can be no doubt, under state law, that an embezzler has no right,
title or interest in the funds which he misappropriates-the funds
continue to be the property of the victim. Thus, under the Aquilino rule a federal tax lien would not attach to embezzled funds
traceable into the hands of the embezzler, and the victim's right
to recover the funds would not be defeated by a claim of Government priority to them.

3

It seems clear, therefore, that the majority in James could have
used the Aquilino decision as a direct response to the dissenters'
arguments regarding the effects of a tax lien on embezzled funds.
Yet, for one reason or another, the majority chose to by-pass the
issue entirely. The only questions directly involved in James, of
course, were the taxability of embezzled funds and the embezzler's
criminal liability for failing to report such funds, and thus the
matter of enforcement could quite properly be left open. But it
is interesting to speculate on whether the majority's failure to
deal with the tax lien issue represented merely a traditional exercise of judicial restraint, or, rather, a calculated effort to avoid a
more vigorous challenge on the merits. For it is at least possible
that reference by the majority to the Aquilino decision might
have brought forth an even stronger line of attack by the dissenters.
A declaration that the Aquilino rule would prevent a lien
from attaching to embezzled funds might have substantially weakened the thrust of Mr. Chief Justice Warren's statement in James
that, for purposes of federal income taxation, "it is inconsequential
that an embezzler may lack title to the sums he appropriates while
an extortionist may gain a voidable title."'6 4 If the Aquilino rule
is applicable, the difference between a voidable title and a lack
of title is far from "inconsequential" as a practical matter. If
under Aquilino a lien cannot attach to embezzled funds, then
although an embezzler is subject to tax on the funds he acquires,
the very funds which give rise to his tax liability are not within
63 Although the question of priority of competing tax Hens is a matter of federal
law, that question is not presented until it is established under state law that the federal
lien has in fact attached to "property" or "rights to property" belonging to the taxpayer.
See cases cited note 62 supra. Cf. State v. Byrne, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9571 (Wash. Super.
CL), holding that a federal tax lien did not attach to funds acquired through fraudulent
misrepresentation, trick and device which amounted to grand larceny, on the ground
that the taxpayer did not acquire any right, title or interest in the funds. See generally
PLuMB & WRIGHT, FEnaltAL TAX LIENS 119-20 (ALl Monograph 1961). See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Burton in Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 414 (1946).
64 366 U.S. at 216.
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reach of the provisions governing enforcement of that liability.
Yet the extortioner's voidable title would undoubtedly be sufficient
to subject his illegally obtained funds to a federal tax lien, and
thus the distinction between the embezzlement and extortion cases
is somewhat sharpened. Moreover, a similar distinction exists between embezzled funds and other types of "unlawful gains" which
have been held taxable (such as protection payments to racketeers,
ransom payments, bribes, grafts, black market gains and bookmaking income) 65 and which the majority referred to in support
of its view that Congress intended to tax all unlawful gains. As
is true with respect to extortion payments, title to funds thus obtained passes to the recipient and the funds would be subject to
a federal tax lien in his hands.
To be sure, different considerations are involved in determining whether Congress has made particular receipts the subject
of a tax rather than the subject of a lien, and it is not suggested
that resolution of the question of tax liability should turn on the
rules relating to enforcement. But the fact that the majority chose
to leave the question open, despite the apparent applicability of
the Acquilino rule, suggests that some concern may have existed
as to the resulting lack of correlation between liability and enforcement if the Aquilino rule is applied in the embezzlement
setting.66 Indeed, since the dissenters argued as they did notwithstanding the Aquilino precedent, it may be that they simply
assumed that the Court would not extend the "gross income" provision to funds in which the taxpayer had no legal interest whatsoever, without also being prepared to extend the lien provisions
accordingly. They may well have believed that a necessary concomitant to the taxation of embezzled funds would be the amenability of such funds to a federal tax lien.
In any event, the tax lien question leaves the Court in a delicate position. If Aquilino is to be applied, the Court would raise
doubts about its decision in James by in effect attributing to Congress an intention to tax funds acquired by the taxpayer as to
which no enforcement provisions would be applicable. On the
other hand, if a lien is allowed to attach under present statutes,
65 See cases cited in Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 137 n.8 (1952), and referred
to by the Court in James, 366 U.S. at 218.
68 Correlation between tax liability and the tax lien provisions is by no means otherwise perfect. In the Clifford-trust situation, for example, the grantor is taxed on the
income of the trust even though he does not receive it. Similarly, in the "assignment
of income" situation, the assignor is taxed on the income which he earns, although he
does not receive it. But those are not situations in which tax liability is based on the
acquisition of funds which cannot be subjected to a tax lien.
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the Court would be forced to repudiate its recent declarations in
this area. With James now resolving the matter of an embezzler's
tax liability, the related problem of enforcement is likely to cause
the tax gatherers some concern. And although the question of
enforcement was not directly involved in James, the Court's silence on the problem may well indicate that the appropriate solution is by no means dear.
III.

OVERRULING A STATUTORY PRECEDENT

The fact that in James the Supreme Court unhesitatingly overruled one of its prior decisions should have come as no surprise.
Indeed, on the closing day of its 1960 Term, the Court overruled
a twelve-year-old constitutional precedent in a criminal case although the party who benefited from the overruling had not even
urged the point.67 It is now generally accepted, of course, that in
constitutional matters the doctrine of stare decisis has, at most,
but limited vitality and must give way to the "dynamic component
of history.

'68

However, where the construction of a statute is in-

volved, as in James, the considerations are somewhat different.
If the Court, in a prior decision, has misconstrued a particular
statutory provision, corrective action might be anticipated
through legislative response to the erroneous interpretation. Particularly would this seem true in cases involving the interpretation of federal tax statutes, for congressional committees are
continuously engaged in reviewing the existing tax laws, and tax
legislation of varying scope and importance is generally enacted in
each session of Congress. Moreover, Congress quite frequently
has acted in direct response to Supreme Court decisions interpreting tax statutes,6and it once erased a line of Court decisions
construing an estate tax provision by adopting an amendatory
joint resolution within one day after the Court had handed down
three opinions reaffirming its previously announced construction
of the pertinent section of the statute. 70
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. Rv. 735, 737 (1949). See generally Blaustein
& Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MicH. L. REv. 151 (1958).
69 See instances cited by Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in James, 366
U.S. at 231 n.13. More recently, Congress has enacted legislation which had the effect
of modifying decisions by the Court in United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 364
U.S. 76 (1960) [75 Stat. 674, 26 U.S.C. § 613 (Supp. III, 1961), allowing taxpayers
an election in computing depletion allowances on certain types of mineral products],
and American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961) [75 Stat. 222,
26 U.S.C. § 443 (Supp. In, 1961), adding § 456 to INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954].
70 46 Stat. 1516, amending § 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, was enacted into
law on March 3, 1931, the day following the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bumet
v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931), Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783 (1931), and
67
68
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Accordingly, when the correctness of its prior interpretation
of a particular statutory provision is challenged, one of the problems confronting the Court is the significance which it must give
to congressional reaction to the earlier decision. Should the failure
of Congress to pass corrective legislation be regarded as tantamount to an acquiescence in the prior decision? Or should the
Court adhere to its right to correct what it considers to be an
error of its own making, without regard to congressional silence?
How should the Court evaluate the extent to which Congress
may have considered the matter before choosing not to act? Should
re-enactment of the provision without adoption of a corrective
amendment be deemed conclusive, or even persuasive, evidence of
congressional acceptance of the earlier decision? Questions of this
type would seem to pose serious problems for the Court, but
the manner in which they were handled in the James case indicates
that such problems may be largely academic.
In James, the United States urged that Wilcox should be overruled on the ground that it represented a misconstruction of the
"tgross income" provision of the Code. The taxpayer, on the other
hand, argued that Wilcox should be followed for the reason that
it was properly decided, and moreover, that if Congress had considered the decision erroneous it would have legislated a change
in the statute.
What was the nature of the congressional response to the Wilcox decision with which the Court was confronted in James? There
were no immediate proposals for corrective legislation introduced
in Congress following that decision. In fact, instead of seeking a
change in the Code, the Treasury issued a General Counsel's
Memorandum adopting the rationale of the Wilcox decision and
modifying its own previously announced rule on the question. 7'
In 1954, when the Internal Revenue Code was overhauled, the
"gross income" provision was re-enacted in streamlined form without any change specifically designed to alter the effect of the
Wilcox case. 2 Thereafter, in 1959 and 1961, bills were introduced
in the House for the purpose of subjecting embezzled funds to
taxation, but neither was reported out of committee. 3
McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931), which cases reaffirmed the Court's prior
decision in May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
71 G.C.M. 24945, 1946-2 Cum. BuLL. 27, modifying G.C.M. 16572, XV-I CuM. BULL.

82 (1936).

72 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a), re-enacting Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(a), 53
Stat. 9. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1954).
73 H.R. REP. No. 8854, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. REP. No. 312, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961).

444

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[V7ol. 61

Yet, despite the fact that Congress had not been prompted
to take any corrective action immediately following the Wilcox
decision and also had bypassed several subsequent opportunities
to legislate a change in the Code, six members of the Court in
James flatly rejected the taxpayer's argument that such a showing
of congressional inaction required adherence to the Wilcox case.
"But the fact that Congress has remained silent or has reenacted a statute which we have construed, or that congressional attempts to amend a rule announced by this Court have
failed, does not necessarily debar us from re-examining and
correcting the Court's own errors. Girouardv. United States,
328 U.S. 61, 69-70; Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119122. There may have been any number of reasons why
Congress acted as it did." 74
Since Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas,
strongly urged in dissent that congressional failure to alter the
Wilcox rule required that the decision be followed, the terse
statement made by the majority in support of the Court's right
to correct its own errors prompts an inquiry as to whether James
represents a significant change in the Court's attitude regarding
questions of this nature.
Prior to the James decision, Helvering v. Hallock7 5 and Commissioner v. Estate of Church" were the only cases involving interpretations of the federal tax laws which resulted in the overruling of earlier decisions. In Hallock the question before the
Court was whether a transfer of property, under which the transferor held a possibility of reverter until his death, was subject to
federal estate tax on his death under the provision taxing transfers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
[the transferor's] death."77 In 1931 the Court had held such a
transfer subject to the estate tax in Klein v. United States.7 But
in the two St. Louis Trust cases"9 decided four years later, the
Court had distinguished Klein and ruled that quite similar transfers were outside the reach of the provision in question. One of
the arguments pressed by the taxpayer in Hallock was that holding
the property so transferred to be includible in the decedent's gross
74 366 U.S. 213, 220 (1961).
75 309 U.S. 106 (1940).

76 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
77 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 70.
78 283 U.S. 231 (1931).

79 Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935); Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co.,
296 U.S. 48 (1935).
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estate would require an overruling of the St. Louis Trust cases,
which, it was urged, should be regarded as proper interpretations
of the estate tax laws since Congress had not seen fit to amend
the provision in question following those decisions. This argument was persuasive only to two members of the Court, and was
resoundingly rejected by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a
majority of six which also included Justices Black and Douglas.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter made it clear that stare decisis was
not a "mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision"80
under all circumstances, and would not be applied where the
result would be contrary to sounder doctrine previously considered by the Court. The mere failure of Congress to legislate
following a particular decision interpreting a tax statute did not,
without more, prevent the Court from re-examining its prior
decision. It was pointed out that there might have been any
number of reasons why Congress did not act, and the Court refused to speculate regarding the actual basis for such inaction.
"It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping
Congressional silence to debar this Court from re-examining
its own doctrines. To explain the cause of non-action by
Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture
into speculative unrealities." 8'
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's comments made it clear that there
may well be instances when congressional inaction would require
adherence to a prior decision, but that Hallock was simply not
such a case. To sustain his conclusion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
noted that there was no indication that the attention of Congress
had been directed to the St. Louis Trust cases, "even by any bill
that found its way into a committee pigeon-hole."8 2 The fact that
Congress had legislated in response to other Court decisions, including a case decided the same day as the St. Louis Trust cases
but involving a different provision of the estate tax laws, 3 was
considered irrelevant on the ground that "the fact of Congressional action in dealing with one problem while silent on the
different problems created by the St. Louis Trust cases, does not
imply controlling acceptance by Congress of those cases."8 4 The
so-called "re-enactment" rule, to the effect that re-enactment of a
80 309 U.S. at 119.
81 Id. at 119-20.
82 Id. at 120.

83 White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98 (1935), construing § 302(d) of the Revenue Act of 1926.
Congress enacted amendatory legislation on June 22, 1936, found at 49 Stat. 1744.
84 309 U.S. at 120 n.7.
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statute adopts outstanding administrative and judicial constructions of the provision being re-enacted, was dismissed as inapplicable on the ground that a technical re-enactment of the provision
in question had never taken place. And to add a finishing touch,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed that "we walk on quicksand
when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle."8 5 The St. Louis Trust cases were overruled.
Commissioner v. Estate of Church, the other "overruling" tax
decision prior to James, involved the question whether a transfer
of property in trust with a reserved life estate was subject to federal estate tax on the transferor's death under the same "intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment" provision involved in
Hallock. The Court had previously considered the same issue in
May v. Heiner,s6 and had ruled that such a transfer was not encompassed by the statutory language. The Treasury, though disturbed by the decision in May v. Heiner, chose not to seek corrective legislation immediately. On March 2, 1931, less than a
year later, the Court handed down three per curiam opinions
which adhered to the rule of May v. Heiner, and the following
day the Treasury requested that Congress amend the statute to
change the rule of May v. Heiner and its successors.87 On that same
day the Treasury's proposed resolution was adopted by Congress
and signed into law."" In 1938 the Court had occasion to consider the provision as it had been amended, and, after a careful
reading of the pertinent legislative history, concluded that the
resolution was not intended to be applied retroactively to transfers
made prior to the date of its enactment.8 9
Since the transfer under consideration in the Church case had
been made in 1924, it was strenuously argued by the taxpayer that
May v. Heiner should be followed by the Court, both by reason
of stare decisis and on the ground that Congress had impliedly
accepted that decision with respect to pre-March 4, 1931 transfers
by choosing to legislate prospectively only and by re-enacting the
provision with its prospective amendment as part of the Revenue
Act of 1932.
But the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, ruled otherwise. It rejected the stare decisis argument on the authority of
85 Id. at 121.
86 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
87 See note 70 supra.
88 Ibid.
89 Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).

EMBEZZLED FUNDS

AS TAXABLE

INCOME

447

the Hallock case and, again relying on Hallock, refused to agree
with the taxpayer's contention that in making the joint resolution
prospective in application Congress intended to accept and ratify
so questionable a decision as May v. Heiner. The Court stated
that May and Hallock were irreconcilable in theory, and held
that under Hallock the transfer was subject to the estate tax,
thereby overruling May v. Heiner.
Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Church brought forth a vigorous dissent from Mr. Justice Frankfurter, author of the Hallock
opinion. At the outset Frankfurter stated that the result which
the Court had reached was "a result the upsetting of which by
Congress is almost invited."' 0 After discussing the history of the
May v. Heiner line of cases, Mr. Justice Frankfurter set forth his

view regarding the significance to be afforded congressional reaction to a prior decision as follows:
"It is one thing to hold that Congress is not charged either
with seeking out and reading decisions which reach conflicting views in the application of a sound principle or with
taking steps to meet such decisions. This is the meaning of
our holding in the Hallock case. It is quite a different thing
to say that a statute does not acquire authoritative content
when a decision interpreting it has been called to the attention of the public and of Congress and has engendered professional controversy, and when Congress, after full debate,
has not merely refused to undo the effect of the decision but
has seen fit to modify it only partially. ... That is this case." 91

This dissent evoked a pointed footnote by Black, asserting that
Frankfurter's position was essentially the dissenting view of Mr.
Justice Roberts in Hallock, which the Court (through Frankfurter) had then rejected. Subsequent events proved Mr. Justice
Frankfurter correct, however, as Congress responded to the Court's
decision in Church and its companion case of Estate of Spiegel v.
Commissioner,93 by enacting the Technical Changes Act of 1949,
which had the effect, inter alia, of restoring the May v. Heiner
interpretation of the statute in question to transfers made prior4
to March 4, 1931, by decedents dying before January 1, 1950.1
As previously stated, the Hallock and Church cases represent
the only "overruling" decisions involving the interpretation of fed9o 335 U.S. at 667.
91 Id. at 683-84.
92 Id. at 650 n.ll.
03 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
94 Technical Changes Act of 1949, ch. 720, § 7(a), 63 Stat. 894.
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eral tax statutes prior to the decision in James. In both cases,
the Court felt free to overturn its earlier holdings despite the fact
that Congress had taken no action which directly altered the results of the prior decisions. But Hallock and Church left unresolved the problem of determining the sort of showing by Congress
which would convince the Court that a prior decision had in
fact been considered by Congress to represent a proper declaration
of legislative intent. Since they are the only tax cases which appear to have dealt directly with this matter, 95 it is necessary to
examine several non-tax cases to obtain a further indication of
the Court's attitude in this regard.
In United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry.,9 the Court was called
upon to interpret the commodities clause of the Interstate Commerce Act. The statute, so far as pertinent, made it unlawful for
any railroad to transport any article or commodity manufactured
or produced by it or under its authority, or in which it had a
direct or indirect interest. The stock of the Elgin railroad was
owned entirely by United States Steel Corporation, and sixty percent of the railroad's business consisted of the transportation of
products manufactured by other wholly-owned subsidiaries of U.S.
Steel. In 1915 the Court had ruled that the transportation by a
railroad of coal belonging to a sister subsidiary did not necessarily
violate the statute, absent a showing that the railroad was acting
as an agent, instrumentality or department of the parent.T In the
Elgin case, the Court refused to abandon its prior interpretation
95 In Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943), the Court was asked to construe

§§ 22(a) and 115(f)(1) of the 1939 Code as including within "dividends" constituting

"gross income" a distribution to common stockholders of additional common stock.
In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Court had held that a distribution of
common on common was not "income" within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment, and thus could not constitutionally be subjected to an income tax by Congress.
In Griffiths, the Commissioner asserted that a distribution of common on common ought
to be taxable income to the recipient, thus urging that Eisner v. Macomber be overruled. The Commissioner's argument was weakened by the fact that § 115(f)(1), on which
he relied, provided that a distribution of stock "shall not be treated as a dividend to the
extent that it does not constitute income to the shareholder within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution." By a vote of five to three, the Court refused
to consider whether Eisner v. Macomber ought to be overruled, holding that the
legislative history of the statute in question indicated that Congress did not seek to
challenge the Macomber rule when it enacted § 115(f)(1). Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by
Justices Black and Murphy, argued that Congress sought to reach as far as it could,
and had no intention of foreclosing a challenge to Eisner v. Macomber. Since Macomber
was a constitutional rather than a statutory interpretation case, the Griffiths case does
not bear directly on the question of the type of congressional response which will persuade the Court that a prior decision was regarded by Congress as a proper declaration
of legislative intent.
N 298 U.S. 492 (1936).
97 United States v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 238 U.S. 516 (1915).
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of the statute. Since Congress had not seen fit to amend the provision following the 1915 decision, it was deemed proper to conclude that "the interpretation of the Act then accepted has legislative approval. 98s No indication was given of the extent to which
Congress had considered the enactment of legislation on the point.
The same question of statutory interpretation was before the
Court again, twelve years after the Elgin decision, in United States
v. South Buffalo Ry. " By a five-to-four vote the Court adhered
to its earlier interpretation of the statute and refused to overrule
the Elgin case. Mr. Justice Jackson's majority opinion was devoted largely to an analysis of the legislative history of the Transportation Act of 1940, which had been enacted by Congress four
years after the Court's Elgin decision. The original Senate bill
introducing the act, as presented to the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, had contained a provision designed to alter
the effect of the Elgin case. When the bill was reported to the
Senate by the committee, however, the corrective provision had
been deleted. Testimony at the committee hearings on the bill
indicated that the committee had decided against the adoption of
legislation which would have had the effect of overruling the Elgin
decision. Under the circumstances, the majority in the South Buffalo case felt that the Court should not act where Congress had
specifically considered the matter and had chosen not to act. The
Court's decision in South Buffalo thus provides greater insight into
the type of showing necessary to satisfy the Court that a prior
decision has received congressional approval.
Application of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to so-called "weekly guarantee" wage plans was
involved in Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.100
In that case the Court was urged to overrule its prior decision in
Walling v. Belo Corp.,101 which had upheld the validity of such
plans. The Belo case had been decided by a five-to-four vote, and
since that time the Court had acquired three new members. In
Halliburton a majority of the Court chose to adhere to the Belo
decision. In addition to expressing the view that Belo had been
correctly decided, the majority referred to the fact that Congress
had permitted the applicable provisions of the act to remain unchanged during the five years subsequent to the Belo decision.
98 298 U.S. at 500.
09 333 U.S. 771 (1948).
100 331 U.S. 17 (1947).
101 316 U.S. 624 (1942).
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As in the Elgin case, however, there was no indication as to whether
Congress had even considered legislating in this area.
A line of decisions involving the oath of allegiance required of
those seeking to become naturalized citizens sheds further light
on the significance which the Court attaches to congressional reaction to a prior decision. In 1929 the Court had ruled, in United
States v. Schwimmer,10 2 that the 1906 naturalization oath required
the declaration by an alien of his willingness to take up arms for
this country. Two days after the Schwimmer decision was announced, a bill was introduced in the House to overturn the result
the Court had reached. Hearings were held on the bill, but no
further action was taken. Two years later, the Court again considered the question, and followed its holding in the Schwimmer
case in both United States v. Macintosh03 and United States v.
Bland.0 4 Shortly thereafter, another bill was introduced in the

House to amend the statute. Hearings were held but again no
further action was taken. Other bills with the same design were
presented in succeeding sessions of Congress, none of which was
reported out of committee. In all, eight bills aimed at correcting
the Court's decisions were introduced in Congress over a period
of eleven years. When Congress finally acted in this area, through
the passage of the Nationality Act of 1940, no material change was
made with respect to the naturalization oath as it had been interpreted in the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland cases. Two years
later, in 1942, Congress enacted the Second War Powers Act to
relax the requirements for naturalization of aliens who served
honorably as combatants or non-combatants in the armed forces
during World War II, but again the naturalization oath remained
intact.
In Girouard v. United States,0 5 the question presented was
whether the Nationality Act of 1940 permitted an alien to be
naturalized despite his expressed unwillingness to take up arms for
this country. The Court, dividing five to three, held that the 1940
Act permitted naturalization in such circumstances, thereby overruling the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland cases. The majority,
speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, rejected the Government's
argument that the failure of Congress to enact any of the bills
which had been introduced to correct the earlier decisions indi102

279 U.S. 644 (1929).

103 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
104

283 U.S. 636 (1931).

105 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
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cated that Congress had in effect adopted, as part of the 1940 Act,
the interpretation placed on the statute by those cases. After
referring to the Hallock case, Mr. Justice Douglas continued:
"It is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone
the adoption of a controlling rule of law. We do not think
under the circumstances of this legislative history that we can
properly place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of
the Court's own error. The history of the 1940 Act is at most
equivocal. It contains no affirmative recognition of the rule
of the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland cases. The silence
of Congress and its inaction are as consistent with a desire to
leave the problem fluid as they are with an adoption by silence
of the rule of those cases." 108
To this point, the Girouard case goes far toward disregarding
what seems to have been a fairly clear indication of congressional
satisfaction with the earlier cases. In the end, however, the Court
appears to have rested its decision on the passage of the 1942 Second War Powers Act, which relaxed the naturalization requirements for non-combatant aliens. Mr. Justice Douglas stated that
"the affirmative action taken by Congress in 1942 negatives any
inference that otherwise might be drawn from its silence when it
re-enacted the oath in 1940. ' ' 07
It is interesting to note that Mr. Chief Justice Stone, previously
a dissenter in the Schwimmer line of cases, felt compelled to dissent
in Girouard on the ground that in his view the pertinent legislative history made it clear that Congress had chosen to adopt the
interpretation of the earlier cases.
In the antitrust field, the Court has taken a much more restrained view and paid greater deference to the silence of Congress. For example, a labor union's claim that Congress intended
to exclude labor organizations and their activities entirely from
the ambit of the Sherman Act was rejected by the Court in the
leading case of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.0 8 After referring to
several prior decisions which had held that labor unions and their
activities were not entirely excluded from the scope of the Sherman Act,109 Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for a majority of six,
pointed out that while twelve bills had been introduced over a
period of years to exempt unions completely from Sherman Act
106 Id. at 69-70.
107 Id. at 70.
108 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
109 See id. at 487 n.6.
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coverage, the most that Congress had seen fit to do was restrict
the act's application with respect to various categories of union
activity. Such action by Congress was felt to imply legislative
acceptance of the Court's prior construction of the act.
In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,"10 the Court adhered
to its 1922 decision in the Federal Baseball case"' and held that
professional baseball was exempt from the federal antitrust laws.
The per curiam opinion in Toolson observed that Congress had
not seen fit to legislate in response to the prior decision, and stated
that any change in the status of professional baseball should come
through legislative channels rather than judicial decisions. Shortly
thereafter, the Court held that professional boxing 12 and professional football" 3 were subject to the antitrust laws, notwithstanding Toolson's adherence to stare decisis with respect to baseball. 14
From the foregoing, therefore, it seems justifiable to conclude
that no valid generalizations can be made concerning the effects
of congressional inaction on the Court's reconsideration of a prior
decision involving the construction of a federal statute. On occasion, as in Elgin, Halliburton and Toolson, the Court has deferred to the legislative process and relied on congressional inaction as a basis for adhering to a prior decision, without
mentioning the extent to which Congress had or had not contemplated corrective action. On the other hand, when the Court
has been plainly dissatisfied with a prior decision and there is no
indication that Congress has considered corrective legislation, as
in Hallock, congressional silence has been deemed inconclusive
and no basis for preventing an overruling. However, where it has
been shown that amendatory legislation was introduced in Congress, and either ultimately rejected or partially enacted, the
110 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
1ll Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922).
112 United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
113 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
114 Mr. Justice Clark's comments for the Court in the Radovich case are particularly
significant: "We, therefore, conclude that the orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination, if any there be, is by legislation and not by court decision. Congressional
processes are more accommodative, affording the whole industry hearings and an opportunity to assist in the formulation of new legislation. The resulting product is therefore
more likely to protect the industry and the public alike. The whole scope of congressional action would be known long in advance and effective dates for the legislation
could be set in the future without the injustices of retroactivity and surprise which might
follow court action. Of course, the doctrine of Toolson and Federal Baseball must yield
to any congressional action and continues only at its sufferance. This is not a new
approach. See Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 255 (1942); compare Rutkin
v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952)." Id. at 452. See generally the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 21 (1946).
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Court has followed a devious path. In South Buffalo deletion of
the corrective amendment was considered persuasive evidence of
congressional acceptance of the prior decision. In Apex Hosiery
failure to enact numerous proposed bills was deemed sufficient
to indicate congressional approval of the prior decisions. On the
other hand, in Girouard failure to enact numerous proposed bills
was deemed inconclusive evidence of congressional intent, though
the Court relied heavily on subsequent affirmative action to support its result. And in Church adoption of an amendment which
Congress made prospective only was considered insufficient evidence of congressional acceptance of existing law prior to the
effective date of the amendment.
Against this patchwork of decisions, it is not surprising to
find the Court in James refusing to pay much attention either to
the silence of Congress following the Wilcox decision or to the
failure of two amendatory bills to be reported out of committee
a number of years later. The Court had sufficient authority in
Hallock and Girouard for asserting that its right to reconsider the
question before it could not be precluded by a showing of such
equivocal congressional reaction to the Wilcox decision.
But there was an additional factor which complicated the
Court's treatment of this question in James. Since the taxable
years involved were 1951 through 1954, both the 1939 and 1954
Internal Revenue Codes were applicable. As indicated, the "gross
income" provision of the 1939 Code had been re-enacted in streamlined form in 1954 with no change in scope intended. The Court
thus was presented with a situation calling for potential application of the so-called "re-enactment rule," to the effect that reenactment by Congress of a particular statutory provision without
pertinent change carries with it an adoption of existing administrative and judicial interpretations of the provision.
The "re-enactment rule" has run a varied course"15 and has
been the subject of considerable adverse criticism, primarily on
the ground that it is extremely unrealistic to attribute to Congress an awareness and acceptance of the numerous administrative
and judicial interpretations which may have been placed on a
particular provision."" Much of this criticism, however, was gen215 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (not applying
rule); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940) (applying rule); Helvering v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939) (applying rule).
1i See generally Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HAzy.
L. REV. 377 (1941); Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARY. L. REv.
398 (1941); Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Constructions, 49 YALE

L.J. 660 (1940).

454

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

erated at a time when it was the practice of Congress to re-enact
the revenue laws every few years, without undertaking a thorough
review of recent developments affecting each statutory provision.
Departure from that practice has weakened the force of this criticism, particularly since the congressional committees charged
with responsibility currently give close attention to significant
administrative and judicial developments in the tax field.
Nevertheless, the rule's application to interpretative material
in the form of administrative regulations or lower court decisions
may be questioned on other grounds. Treasury regulations interpreting a particular provision are not binding and are subject
to challenge in the courts. Lower court decisions interpreting the
tax laws need not be followed by the Commissioner and may be
reversed on appeal. The absence of finality which characterizes
interpretative materials of this sort strongly supports a refusal
to apply the rule where such authorities are involved.
But a decision of the Supreme Court is altogether different.
It represents the ultimate, conclusive interpretation of a statutory
provision, which cannot be altered except by the action of Congress or the Court itself. In view of the established fact that Congress frequently has acted in direct response to some of the Court's
tax decisions, 117 there is thus more justification for concluding that
when Congress chooses to re-enact, without pertinent change, a
provision which has been explicitly construed by the Supreme
Court, it has accepted the Court's determination of legislative
intent and adopted the gloss which the Court had placed on the
statute."18

Yet, despite the arguments which might support an application of the "re-enactment rule" to prior opinions of the Court itself, the majority in fames brushed aside reliance on the rule
117 See notes 69-70 supra.

118 Thus, in Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924), the Court held that the special excise
tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1916 upon corporations, joint-stock companies and
associations "now or hereafter organized under the laws of the United States, or any
state or territory" was not applicable to so-called "Massachusetts trusts," which were
not organized under a statute. The language in the 1916 act constituted a verbatim
re-enactment of a provision of the 1909 Corporation Tax Law, which the Court had
previously construed as being applicable only to corporations, joint-stock companies, and
associations which had been organized pursuant to statute. "In adopting the language
used in an earlier Act, Congress must be considered to have adopted also the construction given by this court to such language and made it a part of the enactment." Id. at
153.
As previously indicated, in enacting § 61(a), the "gross income" provision of the
1954 Code, Congress adopted the language of its predecessor, § 22(a) of the 1939 Code,
with only slight changes in form. See also Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948).
But cf. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), and Brown, supra note 116, at 391.
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with a flat declaration that re-enactment of the provision in question would not necessarily prevent the Court from re-examining
its prior decision in Wilcox." 9
At first blush, such a declaration suggests that the "re-enactment rule" is now a dead letter in statutory construction cases, for
if the rule's vitality with respect to prior decisions of the Court
itself has been undercut, its vitality with respect to administrative and lower court determinations would seem to have been
virtually obliterated. But before reaching any conclusions regarding the effect of the James decision on the future of the "re-enactment rule," it is necessary to recognize that at the time James was
decided the picture was somewhat clouded by the Court's 1952
decision in the Rutkin case.
Although the majority in Rutkin declined to overrule Wilcox,
and expressly limited that case to its facts, there is no doubt that
the language used to sustain the holding that extorted funds were
taxable might equally have applied to embezzled funds. As a result
of the interpretation which Rutkin gave the "gross income" provision of the 1939 Code, the failure of Congress to make any clarifying changes in 1954 with respect to the tax status of embezzled
funds does not present as strong a basis for application of the "reenactment rule" as might otherwise have been the case. Indeed,
the majority in James referred particularly to the Rutkin case
as one reason why Congress in 1954 may have felt that specific action to change the Wilcox rule was unnecessary. 20 For that reason,
it would be erroneous to conclude that the Court in James has
sent the "re-enactment rule" to its final demise.
In the last analysis, therefore, the true significance of the James
case with respect to this problem lies in its rather strong indication that, whenever the Court finds itself in disagreement with the
interpretation given a particular statutory provision in a prior
decision, it is not likely to feel hampered by either the "re-enactment rule" or the failure of Congress to legislate a change. The
broad language of the Court's opinion in James might even be
viewed as a warning to Congress that legislative approval of a
particular decision may well go unrecognized in the absence of
some affirmative congressional action indicating agreement with
or, at least, acquiescence in the decision in question.
119 366 U.S. at 220. See text at note 74 supra.
120 366 U.S. at 220-21. Interestingly enough, the administrative interpretation of
the "gross income" provision, which was in accord with the Wilcox decision, was not
changed when Rutkin was decided or when the 1954 Code was enacted.
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THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF THE SUPREME COURT

A further feature, in some respects the most interesting, of
the Wilcox-Rutkin-James development is the acute illustration
which is afforded of several aspects of the Supreme Court's decision-making process. For the manner and method in which these
cases were decided was quite clearly due to an interplay of: (1)
the effect of changes in Court personnel, (2) the propensity of the
Justices to express individual views, and (3) the frequent tendency
of the Court to speak more, or less, broadly than is required under
the circumstances.
It will be recalled that Wilcox was a seven-to-one decision.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Murphy and holding that embezzled funds were not taxable because of the absence
of a "claim of right" to the funds and the presence of an unconditional obligation to repay them, was joined in by Mr. Chief
Justice Stone and Justices Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas
and Rutledge. Mr. Justice Jackson did not participate. Mr. Justice
Burton, as the lone dissenter, argued forcefully that there was no
basis for reading the "claim of right" test into the "gross income"
provision, and reasoned that the readily realizable value derived
from possession, dominion and enjoyment of embezzled funds
was a sufficient basis for subjecting such funds to taxation.
When the extortion question was presented to the Court in
Rutkin six years later, Stone, Murphy and Rutledge had been replaced by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Clark and Minton. Mr. Justice Burton took full advantage of this opportunity
to renew his assault on the Wilcox decision. In an opinion which
read much the same as his Wilcox dissent, he argued that the
economic value derived from control over the extorted funds
brought them within the reach of section 22(a). In Rutkin, of
course, Mr. Justice Burton carried the day, since his opinion was
joined by all those who had not previously committed themselves
to Wilcox-the three newcomers and Mr. Justice Jackson. But,
although Burton's test of possession, dominion and enjoyment
was seemingly as applicable to embezzled funds as it was to extortion receipts, the Rutkin majority declined to overrule Wilcox.
In fact, Mr. Justice Burton appeared to be at pains to leave that
decision on the books. "We do not reach in this case the factual
situation involved in Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404. We
limit that case to its facts."1"1 The four dissenters in Rutkin were
121

343 U.S. at 138. This was so despite the fact that certiorari had been granted,
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Justices Black, Reed, Frankfurter and Douglas, all of whom had
been in the Wilcox majority. Black, as the spokesman, vigorously
argued as follows:

"A comparison of MR. JUSTICE BURTON'S opinion in this case
with his dissent in the Wilcox case reveals beyond doubt that
the Court today adopts the reasoning of his prior dissent,
thereby rejecting the Wilcox interpretation of § 22(a). A
tax interpretation which Congress has left in effect for six
as a consequence of a change in
years is thus altered largely
1 22
the court's personnel.' .
Notwithstanding Mr. Justice Burton's statement that his opinion in Rutkin did not purport to reach the issue involved in Wilcox, the conceptual similarity between the embezzlement and
extortion situations placed the lower courts in a quandary following the Rutkin decision. In general, the courts acknowledged the
continued existence of Wilcox, but sought to distinguish it in
order to hold the funds in question taxable under the Rutkin
When the Third Circuit held that corporate funds
rationale.
misappropriated by company officers were taxable under Rutkin,
Judge Kalodner was prompted to comment in dissent:
"The plain import of the majority's position is that it
construes Commissioner v. Wilcox to have been overruled
by Rutkin v. United States, although it paid lip service to
Wilcox in attempting to distinguish its factual situation from
that in the instant cases ....
"Like John Alden, the Supreme Court of the United
Had the Supreme
States can and should speak for itself ....
Court intended in Rutkin to overrule Wilcox it could, and
undoubtedly would have said so."' 2 4
But, interestingly enough, when the Second Circuit in 1955
applied the Wilcox rule in favor of a corporation president who
had misappropriated company funds, but who had not been prosein the words of Mr. Justice Burton, "so as to pass upon the alleged conflict between
that decision [United States v. Rutkin, 189 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1951)] and the decision
in Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404." Id. at 132.
.-2 Id. at 140.
For example, the Eighth Circuit, in Marienfeld v. United States, 214 F.2d 632,
636 (8th Cir. 1954), commented, "We find it difficult to reconcile the Wilcox case with
the later opinion of the Supreme Court in Rutkin." And in Macias v. Commissioner,
255 F.2d 23, 26 (7th Cir. 1958), the Seventh Circuit stated, "In our view the Court in
Rutkin repudiated the holding in Wilcox; certainly it repudiated the reasoning by
which the result was reached in that case."
124 Kann v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 1953).
123
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cuted for the crime of embezzlement, 125 the Supreme Court denied
the Government's petition for certiorari. 120 At this time, Vinson
and Jackson had been replaced by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Mr. Justice Harlan. The Government's petition requested the
Court to reconsider and overrule Wilcox, and thus Mr. Justice
Burton was presented with another opportunity to establish the
taxability of embezzled funds. For one reason or another, however, the necessary four votes for a grant of certiorari were not
forthcoming. It was not to be expected, of course, that Black,
Reed, Frankfurter and Douglas would have favored review, since
they had agreed with Wilcox and dissented in Rutkin. But in
addition to Burton, Justices Clark and Minton of the Rutkin
majority remained on the Court, and Warren had availed himself
of virtually all of Burton's past reasoning in his opinion for the
Court in Glenshaw Glass. It may be that the deciding factor in
the Court's denial of certiorari was the absence of a prosecution
which distinguished the case before it from
for embezzlement,
Wilcox.127 But by the same token, the Second Circuit's application of the Wilcox rule in the absence of such a prosecution might
also have been viewed as an extension of Wilcox beyond its permissible reach in light of the Ruthin limitations.
When the Court agreed to reconsider the question of the taxability of embezzled funds in James, Mr. Justice Burton was no
longer on the bench, and Reed and Minton had also retired. Justices Brennan, Whittaker and Stewart thus found themselves confronted with the issue for the first time. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, himself having fully adopted Burton's philosophy of the
concept of taxable income in his opinion in Glenshaw Glass, now
succeeded in convincing Justices Clark, Harlan, Brennan, and
Stewart, and even Mr. Justice Frankfurter,1 8 that Wilcox had
been "thoroughly devitalized" and "effectively vitiated" by Rutkin and hence ought to be expressly overruled. Justices Black and
125 J. J. Dix, Inc. v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1955).
126 350 U.S. 894 (1955).

127 In this connection, Mr. Chief Justice Warren observed in his opinion in James
that "this case [James] appears to be the first to arise that is 'on all fours' with Wilcox."
366 U.S. at 217.
128 For some reason, Mr. Justice Frankfurter chose not to explain the reason for
his switch of position in James. By way of contrast, when he changed his view on the
deductibility, for federal estate tax purposes, of the bequest to charity of a remainder
interest in a trust which might have been depleted for the benefit of the life tenant,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's brief dissent began with the statement that: "Wisdom too
often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late."
Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949).
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Douglas adhered to the Wilcox rule,12 9 and Mr. Justice Whittaker
also strongly argued in dissent that Wilcox should be preserved.
It took fifteen years for the switch to occur. During that time
neither the issue nor the applicable statute had materially changed.
There were, however, numerous changes in the Court's personnel,
with the end result being the evolution of a lone dissent into
the prevailing conception of taxable income. In finally establishing a definite rule of law regarding the taxability of all unlawfully
obtained funds, the Court has hopefully put an end to the confusion which resulted from Rutkin's general sweep, on the one hand,
and its express limitation, on the other.
But while the taxability of embezzled funds was established
by the vote of six members of the Court in James, none of the
various grounds for actually disposing of the case commanded a
majority view. On the question of the embezzler's criminal liability for having failed to report the embezzled funds as income, the
six who had ruled in favor of taxability scattered in various directions. The Chief Justice reasoned that since "the statute contained the gloss placed upon it by Wilcox"'130 during the taxable
years in question, the element of "willfulness" necessary to sustain a conviction for criminal tax evasion could not be proved.'3
In voting to reverse the conviction on that ground, however, the
Chief Justice was joined only by Justices Brennan and Stewart.
Mr. Justice Harlan, together with Mr. Justice Frankfurter, argued
that the trier of fact ought to be allowed to decide whether the
embezzler had in fact relied on Wilcox in failing to report his
embezzled funds as income. 32 They would have remanded for
129 Despite the consistency of his position, Mr. Justice Black did, however, back
down somewhat from his remarks in his Rutkin dissent to the effect that the Wilcox
and Rutkin decisions were irreconcilable. He stated in James: "There is no doubt that
some of the reasoning in the Rutkin opinion rejected some of the reasoning in the
Wilcox opinion. But this is true only with respect to the broad general standards
formulated in the two cases." 366 U.S. at 235 (dissenting opinion).
130 366 U.S. at 231.
131 In view of Mr. Chief Justice Warren's declaration that Rutkin had "thoroughly
devitalized" and "effectively vitiated" Wilcox, it is somewhat surprising that the statute
was considered by the Chief Justice to have retained a "gloss" sufficient to preclude a
conviction for tax evasion in years after 1952, when Rutkin was decided.
1a2 If the matter of reliance on Wilcox is to be left to the trier of fact, a question
arises regarding the proper burden of proof. In a prosecution for criminal tax evasion,
the ultimate burden of proof is upon the Government to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the taxpayer willfully attempted to evade the tax. Under Mr. Justice Harlan's
view, is the Government to prove non-reliance on Wilcox, or is the taxpayer to prove
reliance? In United States v. Moran, 236 F.2d 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909
(19556), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was confronted with the appeal
of a taxpayer who was convicted of tax evasion for failing to report funds obtained
through extortion during taxable years after the Wilcox case had been decided but
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a new trial. Mr. Justice Clark wrote a brief opinion urging that
the conviction be upheld on the ground that as a matter of law
Wilcox could not have been relied on in light of Rutkin and
Glenshaw Glass, or in the alternative, that it was clear from the
record the embezzler had placed no bona fide reliance on Wilcox
in failing to report the funds as income. 133 The determinative
votes with respect to the ultimate disposition of the case were
supplied by Justices Black, Douglas and Whittaker, the dissenters
on the question of taxability. By choosing to adhere to the Wilcox
case, they necessarily favored a reversal of the conviction on the
ground that the funds in question did not constitute taxable in. come.
While the taxpayer thus was successful in having his conviction reversed, only three Justices expressly subscribed to the nonretroactivity rule, which would absolutely prevent the conviction
for tax evasion of those who failed to report, before May 15, 1961,
the date of the James decision, funds which they had previously
embezzled. 3 In view of the divergent positions taken by the other
prior to the decision in Ruthin. The taxpayer argued that there was not sufficient
proof of willfulness since he might have relied in good faith on the Wilcox case to
preclude the taxation of extortion receipts. The Second Circuit upheld the conviction,
rejecting the taxpayer's argument with the statement that, "It is enough to say that
there was no evidence that the defendant had actually relied on the Wilcox case." 236
F.2d at 363. Thus, the Second Circuit apparently would require the taxpayer to prove
reliance. On the other hand, in Macias v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1958),
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the assessment of a civil fraud
penalty against the wife of a taxpayer who had received "side payments" in the course
of his business operation and had failed to report them as income on his joint returns
during taxable years following Wilcox but before Rutkin. The court held that while
the receipts clearly were income the Commissioner had failed to sustain his burden
of proof with respect to fraud, stating that, in light of the Wilcox decision, the taxpayer
had the right to believe that the amounts in question were not taxable income. The
Commissioner had apparently argued that there was no proof that taxpayer had, in
fact, relied upon the Wilcox case, but the court ruled that the burden of proof in
that regard was upon the Commissioner and that the taxpayer was entitled to the
benefit of the presumption that all persons know the law. Mr. Justice Harlan gave
no definite indication in his opinion in James as to how the burden of proof question
should be resolved.
133 It is not entirely cear what Mr. Justice Clark had in mind in this connection.
Rutkin was decided in 1952 and Glenshaw Glass in 1955. The taxpayer in James was
convicted of tax evasion beginning in 1951.
134 The so-called "prospective overruling" theory can be traced to Great No. Ry.
v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). It seems clear that the critical date,
May 15, 1961, refers to the date an embezzler's return was due rather than the date
of the embezzlement, notwithstanding the ambiguity in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's
statement that "willfulness" could not be proved in a criminal prosecution for tax evasion so long as the statute contained the gloss placed upon it by Wilcox "at the time
the alleged crime was committed." 366 U.S. at 221-22. Those who embezzled funds
prior to the decision in James, but who were not required to report them until after
the date of the decision, should not be deemed to lack the "willfulness" necessary to
support a conviction for criminal tax evasion for failure to report such funds.
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members of the Court, it seems clear that the James case establishes no definitive rule of law regarding past criminal liability
for failure to report embezzled funds.
Surprisingly enough, however, the first two lower courts confronted with the question have construed the meaning of the
James case in this regard in virtually the same manner. In the
much-publicized case of Beck v. United States, 35 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit read James as precluding a conviction for criminal tax evasion with respect to funds embezzled
but not reported while Wilcox was the controlling precedent.
The court avoided reversing the conviction before it, however,
by holding that at least part of the unreported funds in question
may have been acquired other than by embezzlement; a new trial
was accordingly ordered. In Estate of R. L. Adame-' 8 the Tax
Court indicated that James might even preclude the assessment
of civil fraud penalties against a past embezzler. (Such a holding
would represent a clear extension of Mr. Chief Justice Warren's
position, since the Chief Justice was careful to limit his rule of
prospective application to a "criminal prosecution" for tax evasion. The question of a past embezzler's civil fraud liability was
not touched upon in James.)137 In the end, however, the Tax
Court held that since the taxpayer in question had previously
been convicted of theft by false pretext rather than embezzlement,
the James case was inapplicable. The fraud penalties were sustained under the rationale of the Rutkin case. The approach taken
by the Tax Court in the A dame case unfortunately indicates that
while James may no longer require the courts to struggle with
the Wilcox-Rutkin dilemma in order to hold the funds in question taxable, 138 the various opinions written in James on the question of past criminal liability may well force a continuation of
135 298 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1962).
136 37 T.C. 807 (1962).

137 Indeed, Mr. Justice Black expressly observed in his dissent in James that the
civil tax liability of "past embezzlers" was left unclear by Mr. Chief Justice Warren's
opinion. 366 U.S. at 224. One district court in Texas, however, has taken the extreme
position that the prospective overruling of Wilcox by James precludes the assertion of
civil fraud penalties against one who obtained funds illegally, though not by embezzlement, but failed to report such funds as income during years while Wilcox was the

law. The Court quoted from Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion in James, and concluded that the prospective overruling rationale was equally applicable to civil fraud

cases for the rather questionable reason that "proof of fraud in a civil action is in parity
with the proof of willful evasion in a criminal prosecution." In re Parr, 205 F. Supp.
492, 496 (S.D. Tex. 1962). See also Estate of Isaac Stromberg, 1962 P-H TAX CT. MEK.
62246 (Oct. 23, 1962).
138 See also, in this connection, Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760, 768-69 (9th
Cir. 1962).
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the struggle in order to sustain convictions for pre-James tax
evasion.
While both the Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court thus gave
the liability aspect of the James case a fairly liberal reading, it
is by no means certain that other lower courts will follow suit.'89
Rather, it seems likely that a certain amount of confusion will
develop out of the failure of five members of the Court in James
to reach agreement on the question of past criminal liability for
the purpose of establishing a rule to be applied in future cases
without the need for speaking out on the issue once again. Such
a situation is particularly disturbing with respect to the question
here involved, since some lower courts may refuse to upset convictions for tax evasion, only to learn subsequently that the Chief
Justice's rule of prospective application in fact represents the
position of a majority of the Court. 40 In view of the likelihood
that numerous cases raising this precise question will have to be
resolved by the lower courts, it would have been far more desirable for a majority of the Court to have reached agreement on an
appropriate rule for determining past criminal liability.
In any event, the James case is by no means the first time that
the Court has failed to establish a definitive rule of law with respect to a tax question which was likely to arise with some frequency. During its 1959 Term, the Court was called upon by the
Government to provide more meaningful guidelines in the socalled "business gift" area. The result was a collection of six
opinions of varying length and breadth, and the conclusion by a
139 Thus, in United States v. Wallace, 300 F.2d 525 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 370 U.S.
923 (1962), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed that the question of
an embezzler's past criminal liability was not conclusively settled by the Court's decision

in James. At issue was the validity of an attorney's conviction for assisting his client
to evade taxes during the years 1951 through 1953. The unreported funds in question
consisted of various amounts received by the taxpayer as rentals due his wholly-owned
hotel corporation, plus amounts expended by the corporation on behalf of the taxpayer.
On appeal, the attorney argued for the first time that the funds in question had been
embezzled by the taxpayer, and under James there could be no conviction for tax
evasion with respect to funds embezzled in the past. The court held that the question whether the funds were in fact embezzled was a question of fact which it
would not consider for the first time on appeal. In the course of its opinion, the
court reviewed the various opinions which were written in James, and pointed out that
only three members of the court who voted to overrule Wilcox also voted to reverse
the taxpayer's conviction for tax evasion.
140 In this connection, Mr. Justice Black's statements on the prospective overruling
of Wilcox are somewhat confusing. At one point, he stated: "Mr. Justice Douglas and
I dissent from the Court's action in 'overruling' Wilcox and from the prospective way
in which this is done." 366 U.S. at 223. At another point, he stated: "We do not
challenge the wisdom of those of our Brethren who refuse to make the Court's new
tax evasion crime applicable to past conduct." Id. at 224.
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majority of the Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein141 that matters of this sort are best resolved, in the words of Mr. Justice
Brennan, by "the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality
of the facts of each case."' 42 In the companion Kaiser case, 43 which
raised what was perhaps a more precise question with which to
deal, and in which a definite rule would have been not only more
desirable but more plausible, the Court was unable to present even
a majority view. The only point on which five members of the
Court agreed was that strike benefits were within the reach of the
"gross income" provision, which as it turned out was not deter-

minative of the case.1 44 The conflicting approaches of those who
upheld the jury's verdict left the Kaiser case, for all practical purposes, as standing for the sole proposition that strike benefits paid
in circumstances similar to those of the Kohler strike were not
taxable to a recipient whose trier of fact found them to be gifts.

45

Again, the desire to express individual views apparently outweighed the sentiment favoring a definite resolution of the question.
Why does this propensity to express individual views exist?
With respect to questions of broad public importance, it is not
surprising to find a desire on the part of the Justices to expound
their personal philosophies. In such cases proper exercise of the
power and responsibility vested in each of the nine men on the
Court frequently requires a full exposition of individual views.
But in cases involving questions which are less significant in their
impact upon society as a whole, an expression of individual views
often serves merely to frustrate the quest for a clear-cut rule of
law.'4 Of course, each member of the Court is acutely aware of
141 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
142 Id. at 289.
143 363 U.S. 299 (1960), discussed at greater length earlier in this article.
144 In Hauser, Business Gifts and the Supreme Court, 38 TAxES 942, 949 (1960), it

was suggested that the "pity" of the Kaiser case was the Court's failure to deal with
the "income" question. While it is true that the full Court did not express an opinion
on that question, it is clear that a majority of the Court agreed that strike benefits
were within the reach of the "gross income" provision of the Code.
145 In this connection, see Rev. Rul. 61-136, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 20, stating that strike
benefits will be considered nontaxable gifts in cases "presenting facts substantially like
those in the Kaiser case," but that other cases "will be scrutinized to determine whether
the payments constitute gross income for Federal income tax purposes." Id. at 21.
145 In this connection, see International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 867 U.S. 740
(1961), involving the right of members of a labor union to prevent the union's use of
their dues for political purposes, in which Mr. Justice Douglas joined the opinion of
the Court solely for the purpose of allowing a judgment to be entered. As he stated:
"Although I recognize the strength of the arguments advanced by my Brothers Black and
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the power which he possesses, in varying degree, to mold and shape
the law of his times. A desire to exercise this power at the appropriate moment and in the most forceful way, therefore, must be
primarily responsible for the frequency with which individual
views are expressed. There are, no doubt, numerous instances
in which a strong minority opinion has ultimately become the law,
and one of the best illustrations of the effect which an individual
view might have in shaping future
decisions is in the Wilcox1 47
Rutkin-James development itself.
It is significant, however, that since there was a seven-man
majority in Wilcox, Mr. Justice Burton's lone dissent did not

interfere with the immediate effort to establish a governing rule
of law. No harm was done to the Court's decision-making process.
A far more serious question as to the justification for an expression of individual views arises in cases such as James, when a
majority of the Court is prevented from reaching agreement on
a proper disposition of the case before it. The breakdown which
thus results in the decision-making process serves to weaken the
Court's role as final arbiter of the questions brought before it.
But perhaps the explanation-if not the justification-for the
expression of individual views in such a situation lies in the even
brighter prospects which are afforded members of the Court for
using judicial power to shape future law.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the various aspects of the James case may appear somewhat diverse in nature, there is a common thread running through
them. In each phase of the Court's decision-whether it be expanding the concept of taxable income, avoiding the related
question of enforcement, weighing the significance of congressional inaction and statutory re-enactment, or wrestling with the
question of criminal liability-the presence of what might be
called "judicial footwork" is readily discernible.
Whittaker against giving a 'proportional' relief to appellees in this case, there is the practical problem of mustering five Justices for a judgment in this case. Cf. Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 134. So I have concluded dubitante to agree to the one suggested by
Mr. Justice Brennan, on the understanding that all relief granted will be confined to
the six protesting employees." Id. at 778-79.
147 An earlier phase in the development of the concept of "gross income" which was
in large part due to the efforts of individual Justices consisted of the Holmes-Brandeis
series of cases which were decided following Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
See generally on this point, Wright, The Effect of the Source of Realized Benefits Upon
the Supreme Court's Concept of Taxable Receipts, 8 STAN. L. Rav. 164, 179-93 (1956).
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Thus, in holding that embezzled funds are taxable to the
embezzler in the year of misappropriation, the six-man majority
in James by-passed the directly-in-point Wilcox decision and chose
to rely instead on the factually distinguishable Rutkin case. In
so choosing, it became necessary for the James majority to overrule Wilcox, something which the Rutkin majority had previously declined to do.
Moreover, in Wilcox and Rutkin only the applicability of the
disjunctive catchall definition of "gross income" contained in
section 22(a) of the 1939 Code was involved, while in James both
that provision and its remodeled successor, section 61(a) of the
1954 Code, were applicable. But the legislative history of section
61(a), which expressly declared that the streamlined, "shotgun"
definition of "gross income"- "all income from whatever source
derived"-was "based upon the sixteenth amendment and the
word 'income' is used in its constitutional sense,

1 48

posed little

problem for the Court. True, the Government could no longer
effectively argue that embezzled funds were taxable simply as
realized "gains," outside the scope of the "direct tax" clause,
whether or not they constituted "income"-an argument which
it had successfully advanced under the disjunctive section 22(a)
with respect to the punitive damages "windfall" involved in
Glenshaw Glass. True, also, the Court could no longer rely on
the phrase "gains ... derived from any source whatever" in the

disjunctive section 22(a) to hold embezzled funds taxable, as it
had done in Glenshaw Glass in holding punitive damages taxable.
Nevertheless, the majority in James had no trouble reading into
section 61(a), and thus into the sixteenth amendment, the broad
concepts of taxable income it had enunciated under old section
22(a), culminating in Glenshaw Glass, notwithstanding the fact
that such concepts may have been intended to encompass something more than sixteenth amendment "income" at the time they
49
were first declared.
And although the distinction between the embezzler's complete lack of title and the extortioner's voidable title is now inconsequential insofar as section 61(a) is concerned, that distinction remains quite meaningful with respect to the related problem
of enforcement through attachment of a federal tax lien. As long
as the Court adheres to the Aquilino rule, that the taxpayer's
148 See note 39 supra.
149 In this connection, see Wright, supra note 147, at 202-03.
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"property and rights to property" against which a lien attaches
are to be determined under state law, embezzled funds traceable
in the hands of the embezzler could not be subjected to a federal
tax lien. Yet the James majority declined to rebut the dissenters' dubious argument that such funds would be subjected to a lien to
the detriment of the embezzlement victim, perhaps because it
did not relish explaining the apparent lack of correlation which
results when embezzled funds are subjected to a tax but not subjected to a lien, a situation which stems directly from the conclusion that such funds were includible in the embezzler's "gross
income."
Another obstacle which confronted the majority in its efforts
to overrule the Wilcox case was the evidence suggesting that Congress may have viewed Wilcox as representing a proper construction of the "gross income" provision. It will be recalled that no
attempt was made to amend the statute immediately following
the Wilcox decision, that no substantive change was made in the
"gross income" provision when it was re-enacted in streamlined
forg in 1954, and that neither of the two bills introduced in the
House after adoption of the 1954 Code, which would have subjected embezzled funds to tax, was reported out of committee.
The majority adroitly sidestepped this evidence, pointed to Rutkin as a possible basis for congressional inaction, and concluded
that under the circumstances the Court was free to reconsider and
overrule the Wilcox decision.
Yet, with respect to the ultimate question of the embezzler's
criminal liability for income tax evasion, the Court scattered here
and there and failed to reach any semblance of agreement on the
proper basis for disposing of the case. Reversal of the embezzler's
conviction was in fact achieved through the agreement of conflicting minorities, a result somewhat reminiscent of the Court's
decision in the Kaiser case a year earlier, in which five members of
the Court agreed that strike benefits constituted "gross income,"
but two of the five found "special circumstances" which compelled
them to join with the remaining four in upholding the jury's verdict that the benefits were excludable "gifts."
In the final analysis, therefore, while its precise holding that
embezzled funds are taxable may not prove exceedingly significant,
the James case has indeed provided a remarkable study of the
Supreme Court at work.

